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I. INTRODUCTION
The Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement
("CAFTA-DR") was approved by Congress and signed by George W. Bush on
August 2, 2005.' Evident from the preamble and subsequent text is a desire for
CAFTA-DR to promote trade and investment among the member countries
through a comprehensive and predictable commercial framework . The
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2007. He would like to
thank the members of the editorial board for their input and assistance. He would also like to thank his family
for their unending support, and to Lauren Dunlap for helping him to stay focused on the important things in life.
1. Central American-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 1, 2005 (not yet
ratified), available at http://www.ustr.govrrade.Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/Sec
tionIndex.html. [hereinafter CAFTA-DRI; Press Release, The White House, President Signs CAFTA-DR
(Aug. 02, 2005) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050802-2.html (on file with
the Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal).
2. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at preamble, art. 10.
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proponents of CAFTA-DR, including the Business Coalition for the U.S.-Central
American Trade, recognize the importance of predictability as a necessary
component for the success of investments between the participating countries 3
Studies done by the United States International Trade Commission ("USITC")
have made claims that CAFTA-DR provides a "secure and predictable
framework for U.S. investors operating in the CAFTA-DR countries" without
expounding more on the degree of predictability by CAFTA-DR.4 Yet, this level
of predictability may be elusive simply because nothing exactly like CAFTA-DR
has ever been addressed by an international tribunal, especially within the
framework of expropriation jurisprudence.
Article 10.22 provides a logical starting point in determining how future
investor-state tribunals created under CAFTA-DR's Chapter 10 will adjudicate
matters regarding investor-state expropriation claims This section states that
when an expropriation claim is submitted, "the tribunal shall decide the issues in
dispute in accordance with this [a]greement and applicable rules of international
law."6 In part, this means that a tribunal interpreting the provisions of Chapter 10
must do so in a manner consistent with Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT"), as this is the customary governing
law on international treaty interpretation. Both Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT
incorporate an integrated method to treaty interpretation that includes the
"objective," "subjective," and "teleological" approach.! This integrated method is
extremely important, because although deference will be given to the "objective,"
or plain meaning approach, the CAFTA-DR tribunals will be able to look outside
the text at the travaux preparatoires (preparatory work) to determine the textual
meaning when necessary.9 Travaux preparatoires has been defined as "an
omnibus expression which is used rather loosely to indicate all the documents,
3. Jerry Cook, Vice Pres. of Int'l Trademark Ass'n, Address before the Comm. on House Int'l Relations
Subcomm. on The W. Hemisphere (Apr. 13, 2005), in 2005 WLNR 5772248, and 2005 WLNR 5772245.
4. S.Rep. No. 109-128, at 12 (2005).
5. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at art. 10.22.
6. Id. The author would like to note that "applicable rules of international law" is a loaded term as it
encompasses a variety of international agreements including, but not limited to, the International Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL").
7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31 & 32, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter VCLT].
See also Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing
Strength of International Law or its Fragmentation?, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 929, 951 (2004) (noting that "[tihe
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties represents the codification of customary international law and is
therefore binding on all [s]tates").
8. REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 239-240 (4th ed. 2002) (defining the approaches as:
"(a) the objective approach-interpretation in accordance with the ordinary use of the words of the treaty; (b)
the "subjective" approach-interpretation in accordance with the intention of the parties to the treaty; and (c)
the "teleological" approach-interpretation in accordance with the treaty's aims and objectives").
9. Id. at 240-241.
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such as memoranda, minutes of conferences, and drafts of the treaty under
negotiation, for the purpose of interpreting the treaty."'
Furthermore, consistent with the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
Dispute Settlement Understanding's ("DSU")" interpretation of VCLT's Article
32, a tribunal may look to the "historical background against which the treaty
was negotiated,' ' 12 and also, though with a more limited interpretive value, to "the
prior practice of only one of the parties' 3 when interpreting a treaty such as
CAFTA-DR. Since the purpose of treaty interpretation is "to establish the
common intention of the parties to the treaty," it is possible that the prior practice
of only one party may shed light on the agreement reached by all the parties.
4
CAFTA-DR is a lineal descendant of the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA").'5 NAFTA's Chapter 11 on expropriation and investor-
state tribunals is therefore an invaluable reference tool for interpreting CAFTA-
DR's similar provisions.'6 Through the numerous investor-state disputes that have
been adjudicated in NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals,'7 it may be possible to
extrapolate how similar disputes will be resolved under CAFTA-DR. This
comment seeks to ascertain how investor-state claims will unfold by showing
how CAFTA-DR has evolved away from NAFTA's expropriation formula
towards an expropriation formula that is more aligned with U.S.' takings
jurisprudence.
10. LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 410 (1961); see also ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS,
I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1277 (9th ed. 1992) (defining travaux preparatoires as "[t]he record of
negotiations preceding the conclusion of a treaty, the minutes of the plenary meetings and of committees of the
Conference which adopted a treaty, and so on").
11. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-ellegal-e/28-
dsu.pdf.
12. WTO, Analytical Index, Dispute Settlement Understanding, art. 3.2, 23, available at http://www.
wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/analytic-indexe/dsu_01_e.htm#articlelIlB (citing the Appellate Body Report
on EC- Computer Equipment I1 86 & 92) [hereinafter Analytical Index].
13. Id. 38 (citing the Appellate Body Report on EC- Computer Equipment, 1 93-95).
14. Appellate Body Report on EC- Computer Equipment, '[ 93-95, available at http://docsonline.wto.
org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/62ABR.DOC ("The purpose of treaty interpretation is to establish the common
intention of the parties to the treaty. To establish this intention, the prior practice of only one of the parties may
be relevant, but it is clearly of more limited value than the practice of all parties. In the specific case of the
interpretation of a tariff concession in a Schedule the classification practice of the importing Member, in fact,
may be of great importance. However, the Panel was mistaken in finding that the classification practice of the
United States was not relevant.").
15. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 605 (codified in
19 U.S.C. § 3301-3464 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; Patricia Isela Hansen, Dispute Settlement in the NAFTA
and Beyond, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 417 (2005).
16. See NAFTA, supra note 15, at art. 1 10; see also Cook, supra note 3.
17. See, e.g., S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, First Partial Award, (NAFTA Trib. 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408
(2001) [hereinafter S.D. Myers Partial]; Pope & Talbot v. Canada Interim Award, (NAFTA Trib. 2000),
available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/pubdoc7.pdf [hereinafter Pope & Talbot];
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, (NAFTA Trib. 2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf [hereinafter Methanex Final Award].
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Focusing on the interpretation of CAFTA-DR's Chapter 10, the crux of this
comment rests on two fronts: one practical and the other theoretical. First and
practically speaking, as an offspring of the NAFTA,' 8 the CAFTA-DR should be
interpreted in light of the textual changes and the evolution of expropriation law
since NAFTA's enactment. Second, and more theoretical, the focus will be on
the three-part test outlined in Annex 10-C,' 9 which is directly taken from U.S.
takings jurisprudence, 20 and how it will affect a tribunal's interpretation/
determination of whether an "indirect expropriation"2' has occurred.
Part II discusses the way in which, textually, CAFTA-DR departs from
NAFTA, highlighting the removal of NAFTA's provision "measures tantamount
to expropriation" 22 and how this and other changes to CAFTA-DR will limit the
scope when determining whether an indirect expropriation has occurred. The
ultimate effect of this limitation will likely resolve some issues that have arisen
under NAFTA as a result of its potentially expansive view of what constitutes an
indirect expropriation.
Part III hypothesizes on the effects of CAFTA-DR's changes concerning
when an indirect expropriation has occurred. This section demonstrates how
CAFTA-DR has departed from NAFTA towards a more U.S.-type regulatory
takings format by means of the three-part test laid out in Annex 10-C. This
section will analyze U.S. regulatory takings jurisprudence as a possible means for
interpreting the CAFTA-DR.
Part IV concludes with a discussion regarding the extent to which U.S.
takings law may be utilized by a CAFTA-DR tribunal to determine the merits of
an indirect expropriation claim. It is possible that U.S. takings jurisprudence,
though imperfect, may help lead to a more coherent formulation for dealing with
indirect expropriation claims. Furthermore, U.S. takings case law may actually
find its way into a future CAFTA-DR tribunal's determination as to whether a
regulatory action amounts to an indirect expropriation.
18. Hansen, supra note 15; William F. Jasper, CAFTA Battle Rages in Congress: the Central American
Free Trade Agreement Would Not Only Destroy More U.S. Jobs and Businesses, But Undermine Our
Sovereignty, NEW AM., July 25, 2005, at 1.
19. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at Annex 10-C.
20. See, e.g., Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also Lucas v.
South Carolina Costal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); H.R. REP. No. 109-182, at 7 (2005), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 337, 339.
21. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 351-352 (2d ed. 2004) (noting
that a creeping or indirect expropriation "cannot be identified through a single principle. The factors that can be
isolated are that there is a diminution in the value of the interest of the foreign investor in the assets and that the
time period over which this occurs is often longer than necessary for a single act.").
22. NAFTA, supra note 15, at art. 1110.
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II. TANTAMOUNT TO WHAT? TEXTUAL CHANGES FROM NAFTA
TO CAFTA: LIMITING THE SCOPE OF WHAT IS TO BE
CONSIDERED AN INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION
As previously stated, CAFTA-DR is an offspring of NAFTA.23 This becomes
evident upon a textual comparison of the two documents. Although almost every
chapter of CAFTA-DR evolved from similar provisions in NAFTA, the
subsequent discussion is limited solely to their provisions regarding
• • 24
expropriation. As an offspring and not a duplicate, CAFTA-DR is not without
variations and changes. The following table highlights some of the major changes
between NAFTA and CAIFTA-DR:
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF MAJOR DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN NAFTA's CHAPTER 11 AND CAFTA-DR's CHAPTER 10
NAFTA I CAFTA-DR
Article 1105- Minimum Standard of
Treatment
1. General statement of "fair &
equitable treatment" as well as "full
protection & security."
2. Claims have arisen under NAFTA
based on this provision including
Methanex v. United States.25 Issues
have arisen as to whether "fair and
equitable treatment" creates
additional substantive rights under
NAFTA.26
Article 1105(2). NAFTA quickly
mentions protection measures and
compensation for investments harmed
by armed conflict or civil strife.
Article 10.5- Minimum Standard of
Treatment
1. Clarification what is included under
"fair & equitable treatment" and also
"full protection & security."
2. Recognition that both "fair &
equitable treatment" and also "full
protection & security" do not create
additional substantive rights.
3. Also includes Annex 10-B.
Article 10.6- Treatment in Case of Strife
1. CAFTA-DR develops and clarifies
upon NAFTA in regards to protection of
investments and compensation to
investment loses resulting from armed
conflict or civil strife. (Quite possibly
because Central America has a history
of political and internal struggle.)1
7
23. Hansen, supra note 15; Jasper, supra note 18.
24. NAFTA, supra note 15, at art. 1110.
25. Methanex Final Award, supra note 17.
26. Courtney C. Kirkman, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Methanex v. United States and the Narrowing
Scope of NAFTA Article 1105, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 343, 344 (2002).
27. Washington Office on Latin America, http://www.wola.org/central america/centralamerica.htm
(last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
2007 / CAFTA-DR and the Iterative Process of Bilateral Investment
Article 1110. Expropriation and
Compensation
1. "Tantamount" provision.
2. Elements that are to be included in
the valuation of the FMV.
3. Statement that a non-
discriminatory measure does not
amount to an expropriation solely
because it causes a debtor to default.
4. Intellectual property exemption,
but without the TRIPS framework.
Article 10.7. Expropriation &
Compensation
Though this comment goes into a
detailed analysis of the changes made to
this section, the following is a list of
these changes:
1. Removal of "tantamount" and the
inclusion of "equivalent."
2. This section does not include criteria
for determining Fair Market Value
("FMV").
3. Intellectual property exemption in
accordance with Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS") .28
4. Annex 10-C and the three-part test for
determining when an indirect
expropriation has occurred. Also, the
exemption of state actions that are
nondiscriminatory and protect legitimate
public welfare objectives.
Article 1114. Environmental Article 10.11. Investment and
Measures Environment
1. Makes it inappropriate for a Party 1. Does not include NAFTA's provision
to encourage investment by relaxing that makes it "inappropriate" to
"health, safety, or environmental encourage investments by relaxing
measures." domestic "health, safety, or
environmental measures."
Article 1118- Settlement of a Claim Article 10.15- Consultation and
through Consultation and Negotiation
Negotiation. 1. CAFTA-DR appears to encourage
1. Brief statement on the consultation and negotiation more so
encouragement of disputing parties to than NAFTA because it goes into the
first seek settlement outside of the various forms of non-binding
arbitration process. procedures allowed.
Nothing directly on point in NAFTA Article 10.20. Conduct of the
regarding these additions made to Arbitration
CAFTA-DR. 1. Allows for nondisputing Parties to
make oral and written submissions to
28. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
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the tribunal regarding interpretation of
CAFTA-DR.
2. Discusses methods for preliminary
objection decisions and includes a
provision for awarding attorney's fees in
relation to the costs of submitting or
opposing the objection.
3. Allows for the possibility of an
Appellate body, should a later
agreement establish one.
Article 1126(13). Consolidation Article 10.21. Transparency of Arbitral
1. A public registrar must be Proceedings
maintained by the Secretariat 1. Must make all aspects of the
regarding all requests and notices of tribunal's proceedings public, including
arbitration. records of the minutes or transcripts of
the hearings of the tribunal, all awards,
and all pleadings and briefs.
2. The hearings must be open to the
public.
One of the more obvious changes that is evident when comparing NAFTA and
CAFTA-DR's provisions on expropriation is CAF[A-DR's removal of the language
"measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation. 29 Using the "tantamount"
provision as a starting point and supplementing it with other textual modifications to
CAFTA-DR, this section will show how these changes demonstrate the unequivocal
intent of the CAFTA-DR drafters to limit the scope of what will be considered an
"indirect expropriation." Part A discusses the reasons for the inclusion of such broad
language in NAFTA. Part B discusses the reasons for both the rewording of the
provision "measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation," and the various
additions to the text of CAFrA-DR regarding indirect expropriations. 0 Part C will
29. NAF'A, supra note 15, at art. 110; CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at art. 10.7.
30. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at ch. 10. The most important change is the addition of the three-part test
in Annex 10-C: "The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a [p]arty, in a specific fact
situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among
other factors: (i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or series of
actions by a [p]arty has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not
establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the government action interferes
with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action." Id.
at Annex 10-C. The other major change that will be discussed is the potential for costs and attorney's fees to a
party who must defend against a frivolous claim or defense in Article 10.20(6): "When [the tribunal] decides a
respondent's objection under paragraph 4 or 5, the tribunal may, if warranted, award to the prevailing disputing
party reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in submitting or opposing the objection. In determining
whether such an award is warranted, the tribunal shall consider whether either the claimant's claim or the
respondent's objection was frivolous, and shall provide the disputing parties a reasonable opportunity to
comment." Id. at art. 10.20(6).
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discuss the likely effects of these textual modifications on future investments in
Central America, with a primary focus on how the new definition of "indirect
expropriation" is to be more narrowly construed.
A. The Need for Expansive Expropriation Language in NAFTA
In order to understand the significance of the removal of the provision "measures
tantamount to expropriation" from CAFTA-DR's Article 10.7, it is necessary to
understand why NAFTA included the provision in the first place.
As arguably the most influential party to NAFTA's creation and implementation,
the United States wanted to ensure its private investors adequate protections abroad
by including provisions that favored them.3' Because not all expropriations are direct
or formal takings,32 almost all U.S. bilateral investment treaties ("BITs")"3 prior to
NAFTA's inception have included protective measures against "creeping"4 or
"indirect" expropriation by using broad formulations, such as "measures tantamount
to expropriation."35 This broad language was intended to protect investors from a
foreign nation's indirect actions that were deleterious to their investments, but which
36would not have been protected under more express expropriation language.
Furthermore, before NAFTA, international investors in Mexico had limited
means of protecting themselves against the possibility of having their investments
expropriated or nationalized.37 Factors that made investors wary of investing in
31. SORNARAJAH,supra note 21, at 289.
32. Jon A. Stanley, Keeping Big Brother Out of Our Backyard: Regulatory Takings as Defined in
International Law and Compared to American Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 349,
361 (2001) ("Formal expropriations occur when a state explicitly affects the legal title of the property,
effectively seizing it in an outright manner.").
33. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 204-68 (providing a useful discussion of BITs). BITs are a
means by which investors of two or more countries can protect their investments in each other's territory. BITs
are made on an ad hoc basis, which gives the involved parties the ability to tailor the provisions to their unique
specifications. This is quite useful because international "multilaterally acceptable norms" do not yet exist. BITs
set out substantive and procedural guidelines, often including international arbitration in the event of an
investor-state dispute. Id.
34. UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
85 (1988) [hereinafter U.N. TRANS. CORP.] (quoting the Starret case before the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, which described a creeping expropriation as "measures taken by a [s]tate [that] can interfere with
property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been
expropriated, even though the [sltate does not purport to have expropriated them and legal title to the property
formally remains with the original owner").
35. Id.; S.D. Myers Partial, supra note 17, at 1440 286 (noting that "this tribunal considers that the
drafters of the NAFTA intended the word "tantamount" to embrace the concept of so-called "creeping"
expropriation," rather than expand the internationally accepted scope of the term expropriation").
36. Jacqueline Granados, Investor Protection and Foreign Investment under NAFTA Chapter 11:
Prospects for the Western Hemisphere under Chapter 17 of FTAA, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 189, 200
(2005).
37. CARLOS MELCER & BENJAMIN DARCHE, ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL INFRASTRUCTURE
REQUIREMENTS AND FINANCING GAPS ON THE U.S./MEXIcO BORDER FOR THE U.S. COUNCIL OF THE MEXICO-
U.S. BUSINESS COMMITTEE WASHINGTON, D.C 31 (1993) [hereinafter MELCER & DARCHE ANALYSIS].
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Mexico included the Mexican government's nationalization of the petroleum
industry in 1938,38 and the failure of Mexico to enter into either the Multilateral
Investment Guaranty Agency ("MIGA") 9 or the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation ("OPIC").4° In order to increase the flow of investments into Mexico (a
major goal of NAFTA), U.S. investors needed the assurance that there would be
ample protections in NAFTA against expropriation and naturalization by the
Mexican government.4 ' The broad language of "measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation" gave U.S. investors this assurance and hence their
support of NAFTA.42 The language was sufficiently broad to protect investors against
future actions by the Mexican government that might have amounted to indirect or
"creeping" expropriation. The extent of actions that may be deemed indirect or
"creeping" expropriations include the "restructuring of an industry or economy, as
well as indirect takings, achieved through oppressive taxation or other governmental
restrictions and regulations. 43
Pro-investor assurances and the need for expansive indirect expropriation
protections led to the inclusion of the provision "measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation" in NAFTA's Article 1110. Of course, as
investor-state claims brought under this provision surfaced, this expansive view
on what constituted an indirect expropriation began receiving extensive
criticism.44
38. GEORGE W. GRAYSON, THE POLITICS OF MEXICAN OIL 15 (1980).
39. MELCER & DARCHE ANALYSIS, supra note 37; see also Daniel D. Bradlow, Should the International
Financial Institutions Play a Role in the Implementation and Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law?,
50 U. KAN. L. REV. 695 (2002) ("[MIGA] provides political risk insurance to qualifying foreign investments in
MIGA member states who have agreed that MIGA can operate in their countries. It also provides investment
advisory services to member states.").
40. MELCER & DARCHE ANALYSIS, supra note 37. See JOHN H. BARTON, BART S. FISHER & MICHAEL
P. MALLOY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 1263 (working draft 2006) (providing a generalized
discussion of OPIC's insurance system against the risk of expropriation).
41. Jonathan Schlefer, NAFTA: Another Victory for Charles Darwin, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1993
(explaining that "[t]raditionally, Mexico has not defined property rights in the same way as the United States.
... Mexico's President, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, has deepened Mexico's deference to property rights. But as
NAFTA loomed, American corporations and investors wanted more. They knew that what Mr. Salinas could
do, his successors could undo. So they exerted pressure on Mexico to guarantee American-style property rights.
The effort succeeded. Under NAFrA, if a signatory country confiscates a business, imposes performance
requirements or violates property rights in other ways, the owner can appeal to an international tribunal for
damages.").
42. MELCER & DARCHE ANALYSIS, supra note 37.
43. Andrew J. Shapren, NAFTA Chapter 11: A Step Forward in International Trade Law or a Step
Backward for Democracy?, 17 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 323, 328 (2003) (citing Lucien J. Dhooge, The
Revenge of the Trail Smelter: Environmental Regulation as Expropriation Pursuant to the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 475, 520 (2001)).
44. Vicki Been & Joel Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA 's Investment Protections and
the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 34 (2003).
2007 / CAFTA-DR and the Iterative Process of Bilateral Investment
B. Rewording the "Tantamount Provision" and Other Changes Made to
CAFTA-DR's Expropriation Chapter
Most of the criticism in the United States against NAFTA's broad definition
of indirect expropriation in Chapter 11 centers on two main arguments. First,
opponents claimed that NAFTA's provisions limited the sovereignty of the
countries involved." This view mainly focuses on the belief that allowing
investors to recover under such an expansive view of indirect expropriation
prevents a host country from regulating in its public's best interest. 46 Secondly,
opponents claimed NAFTA gave foreign investors greater rights than those
granted to investors and citizens from the United States.47
Giving substance to NAFTA opponents' contentions is the fact that a large
percentage of investor-state actions have been brought on the grounds that a host
state's environmental protective measures "amount to a compensable taking. ' '4
Two such cases brought before NAFTA tribunals based on claims of breach of
Article 1110 are Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada and Methanex
Corporation v. United States.49
Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada resulted from a ban on the
importation of methylcylopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl ("MMT") imposed
by the Canadian government in 1997 due to concerns that MMT posed potential
health and environment risks. 0 Ethyl Corp., a U.S.-based corporation, claimed in
part that Canada's ban on the importation of MMTs was "tantamount to
expropriation" under NAFIA Article 1110."' Although the case was eventually
settled (whereby the Canadian government paid Ethyl approximately U.S. $13
million), many thought that such a claim under Article 1110 "challenge[d] a
sovereign's ability to legislate for public purposes," including for health and
environmental reasons."
In similar fashion, Methanex Corp. v. United States arose from California's
ban on the use and sale of MTBE in gasoline. 3 Methanex Corp., a Canadian
distributor of methanol (an ingredient used in MTBE), claimed that California's
45. Mary Bottari, NAFTA's Investor "Rights": A Corporate Dream, A Citizen Nightmare, MULTI-
NATIONAL MONITOR, Apr. 1, 2001, available at http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=648.
46. Id.
47. Mary Bottari, Lori Wallach, & David Waskow, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Cases:
Bankrupting Democracy, PUBLIC CITIZEN, iv, (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/
release.cfm?ID=7076.
48. SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 290.
49. Statement of Claim 21-24, Ethyl Corp. v. Gov't of Canada, (NAFTA Trib. 1997), available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/ethyl3.pdf [hereinafter Ethyl Corp. Statement of Claim];
Methanex Final Award, supra note 17, at preface 2.
50. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, 38 I.L.M. 708, 710 (1999).
51. Id.at71l.
52. Michael G. Parisi, Moving Toward Transparency? An Examination of Regulatory Takings in
International Law, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 383,408 (2005).
53. Methanex Final Award, supra note 17, at preface 1 1.
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ban of MTBE was "tantamount ... to expropriation" within Article 1110.' The
Methanex tribunal came down with its final decision in early August 2005,
stating that Methanex's "central claim under Article 1110(1) . . . fails.""5
Although the final decision came after CAFTA-DR was created, concerns for
such investor-state actions have led countries, like the United States, to favor a
more limited definition of what can amount to an indirect expropriation.56
The removal of the provision "measures tantamount to nationalization or
expropriation" from CAFTA's Chapter 10 happened, ironically, because its
usage in NAFTA made the potential scope of what could amount to expropriation
too broad. Many of the investor-state claims filed under NAFTA's Chapter 11
relied on an extremely expansive definition of the provision "tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation."" The fact that most of these claims were
dismissed on the ground that "tantamount" was not to be read so expansively
does not technically preclude a future tribunal from finding differently. s8
As developed nations like the United States began to find themselves on the
receiving end of investor-state claims, a tendency emerged showing a growing
desire to limit the scope of what can be considered an indirect expropriation. 9 In
August 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of
200260 ("TPA"), in part to "address concerns relating to the investor-state dispute
settlement process" in trade agreements like NAFTA. 6' The TPA also grants
President Bush's Administration with "fast track" authority, which expedites the
Administration's ability to negotiate future treaties.62 The TPA now governs how
the United States negotiates free trade agreements by means of "principle
negotiating objectives., 63 These "principle negotiating objectives" have led to the
54. Second Am. Claim at § VII.C 317, Methanex Corp. v. United States, (Nov. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/15035.pdf.
55. Methanex Final Award, supra note 17, at Part V Ch. D 1 15.
56. SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 356.
57. See e.g. S.D. Myers Partial, supra note 17, at 1421 142; Pope and Talbot, supra note 17, 104;
Methanex Final Award, supra note 17, at Part 1I, Ch. D 28.
58. See e.g. S.D. Myers Partial, supra note 17, at 1440 286. It was stated in the award, after equating
"tantamount" to "equivalent," that something that is 'equivalent' to something else cannot logically encompass
more." Id. (quoting Pope & Talbot, supra note 17, 104). However, NAFTA's art. 1136(1) states that such a
decision has no binding force outside of the particular case, and therefore does not technically preclude a later
tribunal from finding differently. NAFTA, supra note 15, at art. 1136(1).
59. SORNARAJAH,supra note 21, at 356.
60. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3802 (2002).
61. Press Release, Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senator, Iowa, Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of
2002 (July 26, 2002), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/releases/2002/pO2r7-26a.htm.
62. Gary Sampliner, Arbitration of Expropriation Cases Under U.S. Investment Treaties-A Threat to
Democracy or the Dog That Didn't Bite?, 18 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 35-36 (2003).
63. See Alexandra P. Everhart, Comment, From NAFTA to CAFTA: Evolution of the Investment
Agreement Prototype: Evolving Standards for "Fair and Equitable" Treatment and Expropriation in Regional
Trade Agreements, 15-17 (2004), available at www.nacle.org/everhart-complete.doc (on file with Pacific
McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal) (listing the "principal negotiating objectives" of the
United States regarding foreign investment as: "(1) to reduce or eliminate barriers to foreign investment; (2) to
ensure that "foreign investors in the United States are not accorded greater substantive rights with respect to
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removal, or rewording, of similar provisions in subsequent U.S. bilateral
investment treaties.6' Such can be seen in the changes made to the text of
CAFTA- DR.65
The drafters of CAFTA-DR chose to replace the "tantamount" provision with
the provision "measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization." 6 At first
glance, this change appears to be negligible at best, considering that "equivalent"
is used to define "tantamount., 67 However, as stated earlier, many claims filed
under NAFTA's Chapter 11 argued that "tantamount" was intended to broaden
the scope of what could be considered an indirect expropriation, 6 and it was left
up to the individual tribunals to determine otherwise. 69
In the interim award of Pope & Talbot v. Canada, the tribunal first defined
"tantamount" as meaning "equivalent" and then went on to say that "something
that is equivalent to something else cannot logically encompass more., 70 By
replacing "tantamount" with "equivalent," CAFTA-DR eliminates the middle
step, usually left to individual NAFTA tribunals, of defining "tantamount" in the
sphere of indirect expropriations claims.7 ' The term "equivalent," as stated by the
tribunal in Pope & Talbot, does not broaden the internationally recognized scope
of when an indirect expropriation has occurred.7 1 Its usage in CAFTA-DR should
therefore clarify the ambiguity and potentially expansive definition surrounding
NAFTA's "tantamount" provision.
Another change to CAFTA-DR that is not included in NAFTA is the three-
part test, found in Annex 10-C, for determining whether an indirect expropriation
has occurred.73 Although a detailed analysis of this test will be discussed later, it
investment protections" than U.S. investors in the United States; and (3) "to secure for investors important
rights comparable to those that would be available under United States legal principles and practice")(emphasis
added). See also 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3) (2002).
64. See, e.g., U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Singapore-U.S., art. 15.6, Jan. 15, 2003, available
at www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/BilateraU/Singapore-F A/Final-Texts/asset-upload-file708_4036.
pdf; U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Chile-U.S., art. 10.9, 2003, available at www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-
Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FlA/FinalTexts/assets-upload.filel4004.pdf.
65. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at art. 10.7. The removal of the term "tantamount" and the three-part test
for determining whether an indirect expropriation has occurred in Annex 10-C shows a desire to limit the
broadness of what constitutes an indirect or "creeping" expropriation. Id.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1205 (10th ed. 1993).
68. Ethyl Corp. Statement of Claim, supra note 49, at 24; Methanex Final Award, supra note 17, part
II, Ch.D 28.
69. See S.D. Myers Partial, supra note 17, at 1440, 286; Pope & Talbot, supra note 17, T 104.
70. Pope & Talbot, supra note 17, T 104.
71. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at art. 10.7.
72. Pope & Talbot, supra note 17, 104.
73. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at Annex 10-C. "The determination of whether an action or series of
actions by a [p]arty, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case,
fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: (i) the economic impact of the government action,
although the fact that an action or series of actions by a [p]arty has an adverse effect on the economic value of
an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to
which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the
character of the government action." Id. at Annex 10-C(4)(a).
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is important to note here that similar to the rewording of the "tantamount"
provision, the three-part test reflects the fact that CAFTA-DR has improved on
the problems that surfaced under NAFTA and the interpretation of CAFTA-DR's
provisions on expropriation.74 This method of treaty interpretation follows the
VCLT's Articles 31(3)(c) and 32."5 Therefore, a future tribunal's interpretation of
CAFTA-DR should take into account these evolutionary changes from NAFTA
as proof that the drafters intended to limit the scope of an indirect expropriation.76
By placing parameters on whether an action or series of actions can amount to an
indirect expropriation, the three-part test in Annex 10-C demonstrates a
commitment to improve upon the problems that have arisen in NAFTA.77
Even with the clarity that has been added to CAFTA-DR by means of both
the three-part test in Annex 10-C and the rewording of the "tantamount"
provision, an additional safeguard has been included to protect against what some
felt was an abuse of the arbitration process under NAFTA.7 s With the inclusion of
Article 10.20(6), a tribunal may dismiss claims early in the arbitration process
and award reasonable costs and attorney's fees for claims that the tribunaldetemine to " 79
determines to be frivolous. Although Article 10.20(6) does not directly relate to
CAFTA-DR's protections against expropriation, it indirectly limits the scope of
what will be considered an indirect expropriation by penalizing overreaching
claims that have, in the past, been permitted under NAFTA. 8°
It is difficult to give credence to the critics of CAFTA-DR who claim that
"CAFTA's foreign investor protections are too expansive and would repeat the
problems of NAFTA,' 8 when taking into account the changes and additions that
have been made to CAFTA-DR. By rewording the "tantamount" provision,
74. See generally Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systematic Integration and Article 3](3)(C) of
the Vienna Convention, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 279, 283-284 (2005). In the creation of subsequent BITs in a
given subject area, it is inevitable that the resulting texts will share commonalities with those created earlier. Id.
"The important point is that this everyday reality in the practice of foreign ministries has the inevitable
consequence that treaties are developed in an iterative process in which many normative elements are shared.
From having been a series of distinct conversations in separate rooms, the process of treaty making is now
better seen as akin to a continuous dialogue within an open-plan office. A modem approach to treaty
interpretation must adequately reflect this reality." Id. at 284.
75. VCLT, supra note 7, at art. 31-32.
76. See generally McLachlan, supra note 74, at 283-84 (2005).
77. H.R. REP. No. 109-182, at 4 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N., 337, 339.
78. Id.
79. CAFrA-DR, supra note 1, at art. 10.20(6) ("When [the tribunal] decides a respondent's objection
under paragraph 4 or 5, the tribunal may, if warranted, award to the prevailing disputing party reasonable costs
and attorney's fees incurred in submitting or opposing the objection. In determining whether such an award is
warranted, the tribunal shall consider whether either the claimant's claim or the respondent's objection was
frivolous, and shall provide the disputing parties a reasonable opportunity to comment.").
80. See generally H.R. REP. No. 109-182, at 4.
81. Miguel Bustillo, Some Fear CAFTA Would Undermine State's Authority, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2005,
available at http://web2.westlaw.comlsearch/default.wl?rs=WLW5.12&fn=top&db=ALLNEWS&query=CAF
TA+%2fP+%22INDIRECT+EXPROPRIATION%22&dups=false&method=TNC&vr-2.0&action=Search&rp
=%2fsearch%2fdefault.wl&tr=FADAI F2F-4E6F-40C0-B44E-961 1FBFBEE74.
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adding the three-part test in Annex 10-C, and including an award for attorney's
fees for frivolous claims, the drafters of CAFTA-DR are able to afford investors
standard BIT "creeping expropriation" protections,82 and at the same time limit
the potentially expansive view of such expropriations claims under BITs like
NAFTA. 3 The CAFTA-DR removes some of the ambiguity that surrounds
NAFTA's Chapter 11 by placing a ceiling on what may be considered an indirect
expropriation, thereby contributing to the predictability of CAFTA-DR for future
investors.
C. How Changes to CAFTA -DR's Expropriation Chapter Will Affect Investors
The added predictability that has resulted from the changes and additions
made to CAFTA-DR's section on expropriation means more investment security
for those entering into the CAFTA-DR markets. These changes may allow a
participating government more ability to regulate in favor of its country's best
interests-knowing that the likelihood of excessively broad indirect
expropriation claims allowed under NAFTA will be lessened. 4 Still, added
governmental protections will translate into more security for investors so long as
the guidelines for legal recourse are clarified. By establishing clearer guidelines
for determining whether an expropriation has occurred, CAFTA-DR allows
future investors to structure their investments to take full advantage of the
protections offered, without resorting to overreaching claims based on ambiguous
provisions.
As set forth in CAFTA's preamble, the parties involved are "resolved to...
establish clear and mutually advantageous rules governing trade [and to] ensure a
predictable commercial framework for business planning and investment."8 5 This
appears to be exactly what the drafters accomplished regarding the scope of what
will be an indirect expropriation.
82. U.N. TRANS. CORP., supra note 34, at 85; Antonio R. Parra, Applicable Substantive Law in ICSID
Arbitration Initiated Under Investment Treaties, ICSID NEWS, Nov. 10 2000, Vol. 17:2, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/n- I 7-2-5.htm.
83. SORNARAJAH, supra note 21, at 289-90.
84. See generally H.R. REP. No. 109-182, at 4. To emphasize the narrower scope of what constitutes an
indirect expropriation under CAFrA-DR as compared to NAFrA, Congress quotes directly from CAFIA-DR's
text, stating "DR-CAFTA specifies that nondiscriminatory regulatory actions designed and applied to protect
the public welfare do not constitute indirect expropriations "except in rare circumstances." Id. The discussion
goes further into the other protections offered in CAFFA-DR that were not in NAFrA or other "former FIAs"
that give more freedom to host states to regulate in their public's best interest. Id.
85. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at preamble (emphasis added).
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Il. UNITED STATES TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE AS A MEANS FOR
ADJUDICATING INVESTOR-STATE EXPROPRIATION CLAIMS
UNDER CAFTA-DR? A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
86
As noted earlier, Annex 10-C of CAFTA-DR incorporates a three-part test
for determining whether an indirect expropriation has occurred.87 The test
requires the consideration of: (i) the economic impact of the government action;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable
investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the government
action.88 This three-part test is taken directly from Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York 89 and was included in CAFTA-DR for the express
purpose of making CAFTA-DR's expropriation provisions harmonious with U.S.
takings jurisprudence. 90 Yet, as many CAFTA-DR critics have rightly pointed
out, "cherry pick[ing] a few legal standards from a single Supreme Court case"
cannot adequately cover the entire spectrum of modern U.S. takings law.9'
The three-part test fails to account for the evolution of regulatory takings that
has spanned almost 30 years since Penn Central was decided. Moreover, it fails
to include other landmark decisions such as Nollan v. California Costal
Comm'n9" ("essential nexus" requirement) and Dolan v. City of Tigard's93
("rough proportionality" requirement). Furthermore, many commentators have
stated that Penn Central's three-part test is too vague and does not give a precise
measure of what "the law" is and how to apply this law.9' Still, other
commentators agree with the factors but believe the Supreme Court should view
each in sequence, rather than using the current balancing method.9 Regardless of
these issues, the Court continues to adhere to Penn Central's ad hoc, factual
86. The terms "indirect expropriation," "indirect takings," and "regulatory takings" are used inter-
changeably in this section.
87. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at Annex 10-C.
88. Id.
89. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
90. See FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA- UNITED
STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 30 (June 2005), available at http://waysandmeans.
house.gov/media/pdf/l09cong/dr-cafta/EnvrFinalCAFrA-DRReviewprint6-15-05.pdf; see also H.R. REP. No.
109-182, at 4 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 337, 339 (noting that CAFTA-DR's provision on
expropriation "makes improvements over former FTAs by incorporating standards ... drawn directly from U.S.
Supreme Court decisions").
91. David F. Waskow, Dir. of the Int'l Program Friends of the Earth, Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce 4 (Apr. 28, 2005), available at http://www.foe.org/camps/intllWaskowCAFTATestimony.pdf.
92. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
93. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
94. Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 679, 691-692 (2005).
95. ROGER CLEGG, ET AL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: RESTORING PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 8 (Roger
Clegg ed., 1994).
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determination analysis based on the three-part test, rather than relying on any
categorical rules for determining when a regulatory taking has occurred.96
Since Penn Central's three-part test is the current law in the United States for
governing regulatory takings, its inclusion in CAFTA-DR becomes apparent.97 In
granting fast-track authority to the President under the TPA of 2002, Congress
required CAFTA-DR negotiators to take all steps to "secure for investors
important rights comparable to those that would be available under United States
legal principles and practice. '  Penn Central's three-part test sufficiently
achieves this objective without adding significant volumes of U.S. takings
jurisprudence to the text of CAFTA-DR.
The following section looks at each factor of the three-part test as it currently
stands in the United States. Within each factor are a host of elements considered
by a U.S. court in determining whether a regulation amounts to a taking, but
these elements are not readily apparent from the text of the three-part test in
CAFTA-DR. By addressing each factor in turn, this section hypothesizes on how
these factors will figure into a CAFTA-DR tribunal's decision of an indirect
expropriation claim if U.S. takings jurisprudence is actually used. Finally, and
most importantly, this section surmises upon the actual usage of the three-part
test by CAFTA-DR tribunals.
A. Factor 1: "Economic Impact of the Government Action"
The first factor in the Penn Central three-part test listed in CAFTA-DR's
Annex 10-C is "the economic impact of the government action."99 Under U.S.
takings jurisprudence, this requires a court to look first at the entire parcel (when
dealing with real property) rather than its component parts in determining the
economic impact of the government action. ' ° The entire parcel may be likened to
the denominator in a basic division problem, with the portion of the parcel
negatively affected by the government regulation as the numerator.'0 ' By dividing
the affected portion by the entire parcel, the total impact of the regulation on the
property may be determined.
96. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
97. Id.
98. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3802(b)(3) (2002).
99. CAFrA-DR, supra note 1, at Annex 10-C(4)(a)(i) (stating that "although the fact that an action or
series of actions by a [plarty has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does
not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred").
100. See generally Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-131 (1978) (holding
that the court will not separate the airspace value, the surface value and the subsurface value from the property
as a whole when determining whether a taking has occurred, which requires compensation). See also Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 622-623 (2001) (holding that the upland portion, which was a fraction of the
total property, was developable and of sufficient value to avoid the finding of a taking, even though the majority
of the property could not be developed on account of the state regulation).
101. John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535,
1536 (1994).
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The Court's reliance on the entire-parcel analysis hinges on the belief that
unless it is total,' °2 the "diminution in property value, standing alone, can[not]
establish a taking."'' 3 Therefore, although a component portion of a given parcel
may become completely valueless due to government regulation (in Penn Central
it was the property's airspace), a taking will not be found based solely on this
element of the three-part test because the remaining components of that parcel
retain some economic value.'04
The Penn Central entire-parcel analysis was framed in the context of real
property.' 5 However, the Court extended it to personal property in cases such as
Andrus v. Allard,'°6 where a prohibition on the sale of eagle feathers did not
amount to a taking because other uses, including the right to possess and
transport the feathers, were still permitted.' 7  For personal property, the
denominator consists of all of the personal property's uses and the numerator
consists of the "affected uses." As Justice Brennan stated in Andrus, "where an
owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand'
of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety."'0' Since the entire-parcel analysis can apply to both real and personal
property, it may be possible to extend the analysis to intangible property as well,
at least and insofar as intangible property can be viewed as possessing
component parts. If a tribunal is able to analogize intangible property in a way
that is similar to its tangible property counterpart, it is possible that the entire
analysis could be applied to many, if not all, of the "investments" covered by
CAFTA-DR. t°9
It should be noted, however, that there has been considerable criticism
regarding the entire-parcel analysis."0 Much of this criticism focuses on the fact
that there is no set method for determining the denominator in the entire-parcel
analysis."' Under the entire-parcel analysis, a landowner may be left with a
102. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
103. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131 (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 130.
106. 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 65-66.
109. See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at art. 10.28 (CAFrA-DR covers a broad definition of what is
included as an investment, as laid out in Article 10.28).
110. See generally Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory of
Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVTL. L. 175, 190-206 (2004). See also
Gideon Kanner, supra note 94, at 776-79; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631-32 (2001).
111. See, e.g., Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 719 A.2d 19, 26-27
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) ("In attempting to resolve this difficulty, the Courts have addressed the problem of
deciding how the denominator is determined in a regulatory takings case, but they have never agreed on the
appropriate method for determining that portion of the fraction and have provided little in the way of guidance.
Essentially, though, they have all utilized one of the following three approaches: 1) the contiguous land under a
common owner approach; 2) the property interest as defined by the regulation; and 3) the multi-factor
analysis.").
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nominal residue of his former property with the affected part lying idle, yet he is
still required to pay taxes based on the lands highest use. ' 2 Because of the
extensive criticism that the entire-parcel analysis has received from both legal
and economic scholars, it is quite possible that CAFTA-DR tribunals will avoid
adjudicating indirect expropriation claims with such an unclear formulation.
However, since a form of the entire-parcel analysis was applied in the NAFTA
decision of Feldman v. Mexico"3 (which will be discussed later in detail) to
personal property in the same fashion as Justice Brennan did in Andrus v.
Allard,"4 it is quite likely that such a formulation will be utilized by a CAFTA-
DR tribunal. In any event, a CAFT-DR tribunal in an indirect expropriation
determination will have to look at the economic impact of a government action,
and in doing so, will have to define what "it" is that has been impacted. Whether
this is accomplished by using the entire-parcel analysis or some other method
will be left to the individual tribunal.
Another element of the entire-parcel analysis that was not discussed in Penn
Central but has been adapted to property by a more recent Court decision is the
temporal aspects of a given property."5 A regulation that temporarily prohibits
building on a parcel, for months or even years, will rarely be considered a
taking."6 Though distinctly different from the physical aspects of property, the
temporal aspects can be similarly viewed. The Court in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency stated that a
temporary moratorium should not be viewed in isolation in determining whether
a taking has resulted." 7 Rather, the entire fee simple should be taken into account
as part of a court's analysis, and like the entire-parcel analysis, if the remainder
of the fee maintains some value, then it is likely that no taking will be found."'
No categorical per se rule says a temporary moratorium results in a taking. " 9 The
determination must be based on the particular circumstances surrounding the
moratorium including the other two factors of the three-part test. 
20
The entire-temporal analysis, like the entire-parcel analysis, will likely find
its way into a CAFTA-DR tribunal's decision. This type of analysis has already
112. Gideon Kanner, supra note 94, at 777-78.
113. Feldman v. Mexico, Award, (NAFTA Trib. 2002) 1152, available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/16639.pdf [hereinafter Feldman Award].
114. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
115. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (holding that "the District Court erred when it disaggregated petitioners' property into temporal
segments corresponding to the regulation at issue and then analyzed whether petitioners were deprived of all
economically viable use during each period. The starting point for the court's analysis should have been to ask
whether there was a total taking of the entire parcel; if not, then Penn Central was the proper framework."). It is
important to note that the moratoria argued by petitioners equaled to a taking of over thirty-two months.
119. Id.at321.
120. Id.
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been applied by a NAFTA tribunal in S.D. Myers v. Canada.121 In S.D. Myers, the
tribunal held that Canada's temporary moratorium, prohibiting S.D. Myers from
continuing exporting polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") from Canada, did not
amount to an indirect expropriation.122 The line of reasoning relied on by the S.D.
Myers' tribunal is very similar to the reasoning used in the majority opinion of
Tahoe-Sierra.'23 Both decisions hold that a temporary moratorium without more
cannot be a taking/expropriation. 24 Both decisions also disregard the argument
that a moratorium can be viewed in isolation, focusing solely on the time during
the regulation in determining whether a compensable taking exists.'
25
Another element of the "economic impact" factor is how "far" the regulation
must go in order to amount to a taking."26 Only in situations where a valid
regulation has deprived a property of all its value has the U.S. Supreme Court
found the "economic impact" factor dispositive in establishing a taking.'
27
Recognizing the importance of the government's need to effectively regulate in
the public's best interest, the Court held that compensation is not required in
many circumstances, even though the regulation deprives the owner of the most
profitable use of his or her land.'28 In fact, the Court has consistently recognized
that:
[T]aking challenges have also been held to be without merit in a wide
variety of situations when the challenged governmental actions
prohibited a beneficial use to which individual parcels had previously
been devoted and thus caused substantial individualized harm.
129
Two things appear to be decisive for the Court: the character of the
government action (discussed later in this comment); and the property maintained
some economic value even though the intended use of the property by its owner
had been frustrated. 3 ° This type of analysis focuses on the use of real and
tangible property and not the broad array of investments covered by CAFTA-
121. S.D. Myers Partial, supra note 17, at 1440 283-87. The tribunal recognized that the eighteen
months in which Canada closed its borders to S.D. Myers was only a temporary delay to the gain of an
opportunity. Id. Canada derived no benefit from the closure and no transfer of property existed, which is
comparable to Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002).
122. S.D. Myers Partial, supra note 17, at 1440 283-87.
123. See e.g., id.; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 321.
124. See e.g. S.D. Myers Partial, supra note 17, at 1440 1 283-287.
125. Id.
126. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (citing Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
127. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
128. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 470 (1981); Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-593 (1962).
129. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 125 (citing Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)).
130. See generally Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); see also Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 592-93.
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DR. Only time will determine whether CAFTA-DR tribunals will apply the
"economic impact" analysis of the three-part test in the same manner as U.S.
courts and to all CAFTA-DR "covered investments."
The NAFTA tribunal's decision regarding the indirect expropriation claim in
Feldman v. Mexico supports the application of a U.S.-like "economic impact"
analysis by a CAFTA-DR tribunal to all CAFTA-DR "covered investments.'3 2
In Feldman, the petitioner claimed Mexico had indirectly expropriated his
investment, an exportation business known as CEMSA.'33 The petitioner argued
that Mexico had indirectly expropriated his investment by refusing to grant him
tax-refund benefits he believed was due for the cigarette exportation component
of his business.'34 Though the petitioner's exportation business had primarily
focused on the exportation of cigarettes from Mexico, his business had retained
some value in the exportation of other products, and therefore no indirect
expropriation was found.15 The tribunal stated that "[t]he Claimant is free to
pursue other continuing lines of export trading, such as exporting alcoholic
beverages, photograph supplies, or other products ... although he is effectively
precluded from exporting cigarettes."'' 36 The Feldman tribunal recognized that the
petitioner was able to continue his investment of exporting, though the regulation
(i.e., the taxation program) may have frustrated the most profitable use of his
exportation business.1
37
Had the Feldman tribunal applied the three-part test in Annex 10-C, they
would likely have found that the other two factors outweighed the "economic
impact" factor and determined that no expropriation could have existed. The
tribunal made note of the fact that the regulation was for a valid public purpose'3 8
(a major component of the "character of the government action" factor), and the
assurances the claimant relied on were in direct conflict with Mexico's existing
laws (an issue addressed under the "investment backed expectations" factor). 139
Similarly, if the U.S. Supreme Court faced a claim factually analogous to
Feldman, it would likely analyze the "economic impact" of the regulation in the
same manner as the Feldman tribunal. The decision by the Feldman tribunal
regarding indirect expropriation claims therefore demonstrates how the three-part
test in Annex 10-C of CAFTA-DR (with a special emphasis on the "economic
impact" factor) could be applied in a manner consistent with U.S. takings law
and also square with the current international expropriation framework.
131. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at art. 10.7.
132. Feldman Award, supra note 113, 152.
133. Id. 11, 6-23.
134. Id.
135. Id. 152.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 136.
139. Id. [148-49.
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Though Feldman demonstrates how a CAFTA-DR tribunal's decision could
square directly with U.S. takings jurisprudence, there is argument to the contrary
presented in Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States. 40 This claim arose out of
Mexico's improper refusal to grant a permit to a subsidiary of Metalclad, a U.S.
waste-disposal company, to operate a hazardous waste facility, which it had
already built in La Pedrera, San Luis Potosi.' 4' A part of Metalclad's indirect
expropriation claim focused on an ecological decree enacted by San Luis Potosi's
governor for the protection of rare cactus in, and around, the area of the waste
disposal facility. 42 Though the environmental decree only involved the land, it
essentially made the use of the waste disposal facility impossible.'43 Rather than
addressing any potential economic value that could be derived from the land on
which the waste disposal site sat, the Metalclad tribunal simply stated that the
ecological decree "in, and of itself, constitute[d] an act tantamount to
expropriation.'""
Had a U.S. court addressed Metalclad's claim under the Penn Central three-
part test, it is quite likely that the ecological decree would not have amounted to a
regulatory taking. 45 Under the three-part test, the tribunal would likely have
recognized that only those activities that "might involve the discharge of
polluting agents on the reserve soil' 146 would be prohibited and therefore other
uses for the land might still exist. With such an environmental decree well within
the police powers of the government, the expropriation claim would have likely
failed under U.S. takings jurisprudence.
A key distinction must be made, however, before completely writing off the
Metalclad tribunal's decision (focusing solely on their discussion regarding the
ecological decree) as contrary to U.S. takings law. The Metalclad tribunal
correctly limited its focus to Metalclad Corp.'s investment, as NAFTA required it
to do.' 47 Though the investment involved real property, the investment itself was
a waste disposal facility.' 48 Consequently, there was no need for the Metalclad
tribunal to look at alternative uses for the land on which the investment sat
140. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico (NAFrA Trib. 2000) 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001).
141. Id. at 37-38.
142. Id. at 44-45.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 51.
145. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). The Palazzolo court recognized that the
property retained some value notwithstanding the regulation, even though the property would not be used as the
petitioner intended. Id.; see also Cat Lazaroff, Billion Dollar NAFTA Challenge to California MTBE Ban,
ENVT'L NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 11, 2000, available at http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=570 (noting that
"[ijn a U.S. court, the Metalclad challenge would have failed. Under U.S. law, the state government's action
would likely not be considered a taking of the investor's property requiring compensation under the U.S.
Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court.").
146. Metalclad Corp., 40 I.L.M. at 50.
147. See NAFTA, supra note 15, at art. 1110 (stating that "[n]o party may directly or indirectly
nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor") (emphasis added).
148. Metalclad Corp., 40 I.L.M. at 36, 37.
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because the land was not the investment. 49 Since the deprivation to the
investment appeared to be total-Metalclad could no longer operate its waste
facility with the environmental decree in place-the tribunal's decision can be
reconciled with U.S. case law that holds that a taking will be found when all
value has been deprived from the property as a result of a regulation.
To protect a host state from encountering similar issues faced in Metalclad
Corp. (where a valid environmental regulation could amount to an indirect
expropriation because it effectively makes an investment valueless), CAFTA-DR
created a catch-all provision to coincide with the three-part test: Annex 10-
C(4)(b). 5 ' Under this provision, only in "rare circumstances" would an
environmental decree such as the one in Metalclad amounted, "in and of itself,"
to an indirect expropriation as the Metalclad tribunal concluded. 2 Annex 10-
C(4)(b) recognizes that a government must be able to effectively regulate for
"legitimate public welfare objectives." These "objectives" are no different than
the "police powers' ' 153 recognized by U.S. courts. 54 Since an environmental
decree, like the one in Metalclad, would fall well within the "police powers"
intended by Annex 10-C(4)(b), the regulation, "in and of itself,"'5 could not be
grounds for finding an indirect expropriation. It is important to note, however,
that since Metalclad's investment was deemed economically valueless, the
tribunal's decision finding an expropriation was accurate both under NAFTA and
U.S. takings jurisprudence. 6
Because Annex 10-C(4)(b) could potentially have a quelling effect on a
tribunal's determination of whether a governmental regulation amounts to an
indirect expropriation, it is important to understand how this provision will likely
play out in relation to the Penn Central three-part test in a tribunal's analysis.
The language of Annex 10-C(4)(b) does not clarify the type of regulatory action
that will reach this "rare circumstances" level. Yet, the determination of how or
when a regulation meets this heightened standard is important because, as U.S.
Supreme Court decisions have shown, almost any governmental regulation could
effectively fall within this "police powers" category. 7 Rather than viewing
149. Id.
150. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
151. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at Annex 10-C(4)(b) (stating that "[e]xcept in rare circumstances,
nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a [p]arty that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect
expropriations").
152. Id.; Metalclad Corp., 40 I.L.M. at 51.
153. D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 471 (2004).
154. See Everhart, supra note 63, at 26-27.
155. Metalclad Corp., 40 I.L.M. at 51.
156. Sampliner, supra note 62, at 21-22.
157. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (holding that "[tihe police power is not
confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values,
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people."); see also
Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S 104, 134 (1978) (holding that the preservation of
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Annex 10-C(4)(b) as the determinative factor for deciding whether a valid
regulation amounts to an indirect expropriation, it is more likely that the drafters
of CAFTA-DR intended Annex 10-C(4)(b) to be analyzed within the three-part
test framework. Otherwise, it would effectively make the three-part test
superfluous."'
Furthermore, as its own separate factor, Annex 10-C(4)(b) would go well
beyond U.S. takings jurisprudence in protecting a host state's regulatory practices
from being attacked on expropriation grounds. However, including Annex 10-
C(4)(b) as part of the three-part test analysis aligns an indirect expropriation
determination under CAFTA-DR with U.S. takings laws as the U.S. negotiators
intended.159 An investor-claimant would have the heavy burden of proving that a
valid regulation amounted to an indirect expropriation by means of the Penn
Central three-part test. Yet, the investor-claimant could be meritorious in his
expropriation claim, and the tribunal's determination would not be totally
arbitrary. Using U.S. takings jurisprudence as a guide, a regulation that
"protect[s] legitimate public welfare objectives" and is "nondiscriminatory" may
nevertheless equate to an indirect expropriation if it would unfairly "force some
people alone to bear public burdens, which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole."' 6
B. Factor 2: "Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations"
The second factor in the Penn Central three-part test listed in CAFTA-DR's
Annex 10-C is "the extent to which the government action interferes with
distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations.,,16 1 U.S. courts have
recognized that the purpose of this factor is to limit compensation to property
owners who can show that their property was purchased in reliance on the non-
existence of the challenged regulation.162 By requiring the "investment-backed
expectation" to be reasonable, the standard maintains its objectivity. 63
The "reasonable investment-backed expectations" factor requires a two-part
landmarks was seen as well within the police powers of New York because it benefited New Yorkers
"economically" and also by "improving the quality of life in the city").
158. The provision of Annex 10-C(4)(b) standing alone as a factor would be arbitrary because it would
allow each tribunal to create its own formulation in determining what valid regulation would meet the "rare
circumstances" level. Such an exercise of discretion by a tribunal would appear to go against the intention of the
drafters who felt it was necessary to include a three-part test to help aid a tribunal in determining the occurrence
of an indirect expropriation. It would seem counterintuitive for the drafters to build off of the vagueness
surrounding NAFTA by creating an equally vague standard in CAFA-DR. See e.g. 151 CONG. REC. D386-01
(Apr. 21, 2005) (debate between Congressman Doggett and Ambassador Allgeier), available at http://waysand
means.house.gov//hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=3061 [hereinafter Doggett/Allgeier Debate].
159. Id.
160. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
161. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at Annex 10-C(4)(a)(ii).
162. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
163. Id. at 1346.
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analysis. A court must first determine whether the claimant, when purchasing
property, had an actual expectation that the property would not be affected by the
regulation in question." Once a court makes this fact-based determination and
finds that the claimant did have such an expectation, the next step is determining
whether such an expectation was reasonable. 65 As stated before, this is an
objective standard, requiring a court to interpret what a reasonable person in the
claimant's situation would have expected when purchasing the property.' 66 U.S.
courts have been hesitant to recognize reasonableness in situations where "a
party voluntarily enters into a heavily regulated program or contract.'
67
Furthermore, a landowner is constrained by regulations that are deemed
"background principles" of a state's law of property and nuisance. 16 This means
that if the government enacts a new regulation that is consistent with bedrock
principles of property law, a claimant will not have reasonable investment-
backed expectations counter to the regulation; thus, the claimant will be unable to
prove a compensable taking.'69
A lucid application of the "reasonable investment-backed expectations"
factor can be seen in the Court of Appeals Federal Circuit decision in Cienega
Gardens v. United States. 70 The appellants, various owners of low-income
apartments, sued the United States alleging that federal statutes consummated in
a taking of their property.'' In securing mortgages for the construction of these
apartments, appellants had entered into a forty-year agreement with the
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). 72 This agreement
required the appellants to maintain their apartments for low-income tenants over
the duration of the agreement.17 However, under the agreement, the appellants
had the option to prepay their mortgages after twenty years without HUD
approval, and in so doing could "remove their property from the federally-
assisted low-income housing pool.', 74 When the twenty-year mark approached,
Congress, fearing the harm that would result to the current tenants if many of the
owners prepaid their mortgages, changed the HUD requirements. 75 Under the
164. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Penn. Coal. Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
165. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-06 (1984).
166. Id.
167. 26 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § 15 (2005) (citing Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 475
U.S. 211 (1986)).
168. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629 (2001).
169. Id. at 629-30.
170. 331 F.3d 1319 (2003).
171. Id. at 1324.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1325.
174. Id. at 1326.
175. Id. (noting that Congress enacted the Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act
("ELIHPA") § 202(a)(4) in 1987 based on "findings indicat[ing] that almost 950,000 low-income housing units
could soon be lost through mortgage prepayments").
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changes adopted, the owners were required to acquire HUD approval to prepay
their mortgages even after the twenty-year mark, though their mortgage contracts
had provisions stating the opposite."' They were thus unable to exit the HUD
program after twenty years and thereby regain normal ownership rights.'77
In applying the "reasonable investment-backed expectations" factor, the
court noted that the critical question did not focus on the appellant property
owners' expectations, but that of "a reasonable developer confronted with the
particular circumstances facing the [appellants]."'7  However, the court
recognized that appellants' actual expectations of prepayment were important
because they would not be "investment-backed" unless they actually relied on
them when they entered into the HUD program. 79 Once the court made a factual
determination that the appellants entered the program with the expectation of
prepaying the mortgage after twenty years without HUD approval, the next step
was to determine whether this expectation was reasonable. 80 Since the
appellants' expectations were based on a material term of the HUD agreement,
they were deemed reasonable.'"' Appellants were therefore meritorious in proving
the "reasonable investment-backed expectations" factor of the Penn Central
three-part test.
A similar application of the U.S. two-part analysis under the "reasonable
investment-backed expectations" factor will almost certainly find its way into a
CAFTA-DR tribunal's decision because this type of analysis has already been
applied by various NAFTA tribunals.'82 Also, the plain meaning of the factor's
text requires this analytical format. In order to establish an "investment-backed
expectation," the claimant would be required to show that he or she actually had
such an expectation, and in order for it to be reasonable, the tribunal would have
to look at it from an objective standpoint.
Though couched in different terminology, certain NAFTA decisions have
applied an almost identical "investment backed-expectation" two-part analysis
under the heading of "reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit.' 8, 3 In
Feldman, the tribunal applied a two-part analysis in finding that the plaintiff did
not have a reasonable investment-backed expectation on which an expropriation
claim could be based.' 4 In the first part of the analysis, the tribunal recognized
that the plaintiffs investment-backed expectation (at least as claimed by the
plaintiff) was that he was entitled to the cigarette tax-rebates based on past
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1327.
178. Id. at 1346.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1348.
181. Id.
182. See generally Methanex Final Award, supra note 17, at Part IV, Ch. D 9; See also Feldman
Award, supra note 113, 148-149.
183. Feldman Award, supra note 113, 1 148-149; Metalclad Corp., 40 I.L.M. at 50.
184. Feldman Award, supra note 113, at 148-149.
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assurances by the Mexican government.' 5 However, in determining that these
expectations were unreasonable, the tribunal noted that "the Mexican government
essentially opposed Claimant's business activities at every step of the way ...
[and] the assurances allegedly relied on by the Claimant were at best ambiguous
... and largely informal."'8 6 In reaching its decision, the tribunal distinguished
Metalclad Corp. by recognizing that the assurances offered by the Mexican
government that Metalclad relied on were "definitive, unambiguous and
repeated" and were consistent with Mexican law.'87
Methanex is another important NAFTA tribunal judgment regarding the
"reasonable investment-backed expectations," because it emphasizes the effects
of a claimant's voluntary entry into a heavily regulated program.'88 The tribunal
recognized that when Methanex began selling methanol in California, it had
entered into a "political economy in which it was well known, if not notorious,"
that the government at both the national and state level monitored and often
restricted the use of certain chemical compounds.'89 In fact, Methanex had
employed its own lobbyists to address these political concerns, and even more
telling, the existence of the MTBE market was a result of earlier governmental
restrictions on other chemical compounds.'19 Having entered into a heavily-
regulated market, Methanex was unable to argue that it did not address the
possibility of such a regulation affecting its product when forming its
"investment-backed expectations."
It is almost certain that future CAFTA-DR tribunals, in applying the three-
part test in Annex 10-C, will rely on the same type of analysis used by U.S.
courts when determining an investor's "reasonable investment backed
expectations." First, the tribunal must determine the actual expectations that the
investor had when entering into the investment for which the expropriation claim
is based. Second, the tribunal must apply an objective standard in deciding
whether the investor's actual expectation was reasonable. Both the plain
language of the "reasonable investment-backed expectations" provision in
CAFTA-DR and recent NAFTA tribunal decisions (under the heading
"reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit") 9' support the likelihood that a
U.S.-type two-part analysis will be used by CAFTA-DR tribunals. Therefore, it is
imperative that investors entering Central America be fully aware of the region's
political and economic climate, as well any other factors that could reasonably
impact their investments.
185. Id.
186. Id. 149.
187. Id. 1148.
188. Methanex Final Award, supra note 17, at Part IV, Ch. D [ 9.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Feldman Award, supra note 113, 1 148-149; Metalclad Corp., 40 I.L.M. at 50.
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C. Factor 3: "The Character of the Government Action"
The "character of the government action" factor requires a U.S. court to
balance two competing interests in determining whether a governmental
regulation amounts to a compensable taking.' 92 On one side of the balance is "the
liberty interest of the private property owner."' 93 Weighed against this is the
"[g]overnment's need to protect the public interest through the imposition of the
[regulation]." '9 Factors that have been incorporated into this determination
include the degree and type of harm created by the property owner's prohibited
activity, the social value and location of the prohibited activity, and the ease of
preventing the harm caused by the activity.'95 Implicit in this analysis is the
recognition that a government must be able to regulate in the best interest of the
public.' 96 Therefore, not every regulation that causes a diminution in the value of
property should require compensation.' 97
Recognizing that the U.S. government could hardly "go on" if compensation
were required every time a government regulation diminished a property's value,
the Supreme Court has been very deferential towards governmental directives
based on legitimate police powers.'98 As shown by the majority opinion in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, if a regulation can be
characterized as promoting "health, safety, morals or general welfare" and is not
discriminatory, it will be very difficult for a claimant to successfully establish
that the regulation resulted in a compensable taking.' 99
192. 26 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § 14 (2005) (citing Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d
1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
193. Cienega Gardens, 331 F.3d at 1338 (citing Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171,
1176 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
194. Id.
195. See generally Maritrans. Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
196. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 124-33. The Penn Central decision is a perfect example of the deferential treatment that
courts give to government regulations that can be characterized as promoting "health, safety, morals or general
welfare." In its decision, the Court first determined that the New York Landmark Preservation Law of 1965 was
well within the police powers of the state because it promoted the general welfare of New York City. Id. at 129.
Appellants, owners of the historic Grand Central Terminal, agreed that New York could enact regulations
pursuant to landmark protectionism. Id. Nevertheless, the appellants claimed they had suffered a taking because
the regulation had sufficiently diminished the value of their property. Id. at 130-31. They argued that since the
regulation was intended to benefit the public, the costs should be born by the public rather than the private
property owners whose property had been adversely affected. Id. Focusing solely on the character of the
government action factor, the Court rejected appellant's takings claim because holding otherwise would
invalidate all comparable landmark legislation across the country. Id. at 13 1. Furthermore, the regulation was
not discriminatory in that it did not arbitrarily grant less favorable treatment to some property and not others.
Rather, it was designed to preserve historic buildings wherever they might be found in the city pursuant to a
comprehensive plan. Id. at 132. The New York Landmark Preservation Law furthered the legitimate goal of
"enhance[ing] the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of [the] city" and
was therefore a valid exercise of New York City's police powers. Id. at 129.
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Though U.S. courts generally grant deferential treatment to the government,
certain governmental actions have been found to tilt the balance in favor of the
private property owner regardless of the public interest that might be furthered.
These actions can be categorized as infringing on "the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property"2°° and include: (1)
when a regulation amounts to a physical invasion;2°1 (2) when a government
regulation is so pervasive that it leaves the property economically valueless 2
(though this deals with the "economic impact of the government action," it also
can be analyzed under the "character of the government action" factor) 23 ; and (3)
when a regulation infringes on the property owner's right to transfer.2 4 These are
the limited situations that can be described as extraordinary circumstances .
Outside of the aforementioned "extraordinary circumstances," a court will
generally hesitate to characterize a government regulation as a taking if the
regulation is exercised under valid governmental police powers. 206
U.S. courts have developed a broad and comprehensive definition of what
may be considered a valid exercise of the police powers. This includes any
regulation that promotes "health, safety, morals or [the] general welfare., 207 At
the international level, however, a precise authoritative definition of what
constitutes a commonly accepted valid exercise of a state's police powers does
not currently exist.2°s The absence of clearly defined police powers in
international law posits the reason for the inclusion of Annex 10-C(4)(b) in
CAFTA-DR. 2°9 Without an international definition to rely on, the highly
developed definition from U.S. takings jurisprudence may have offered a suitable
alternative for CAFTA-DR drafters to use.210 A plain language comparison shows
that the text of Annex 10-C(4)(b) has considerable similarities to the "health,
safety, morals or general welfare" language used in Penn Central."' This gives
200. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
201. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
202. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastel Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
203. ROGER CLEGG, ET AL, supra note 95, at 50-51.
204. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715-16 (1987) (holding that a statute which abrogated the right to
devise to one's heirs regardless of the size of the devised portion of the property (much of the property involved
was only a very small fraction of the total land) was a taking).
205. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1338-40 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
206. ROGER CLEGG, supra note 95, at 48-52.
207. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-33 (1978).
208. Sampliner, supra note 62, at 21-22.
209. CAFrA-DR, supra note 1, at Annex 10-C(4)(b).
210. Sampliner, supra note 62, at 10-11. It seems logical that U.S. domestic law could add clarity in
defining the police powers because of the "abundance of precedent" found in U.S. takings jurisprudence
regarding the police powers. Id. As many scholars believe, "such precedent should play a significant role in
determining applicable principles of international law." Id.
211. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at Annex 10-C(4)(b) (noting that "[e]xcept in rare circumstances,
nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a [plarty that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect
expropriations").
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credence to the argument that Annex 10-C(4)(b) will be incorporated into the
Penn Central three part-test rather than analyzed as its own distinct factor. Since
analysis of the "character of the government action" factor hinges on the
recognition of valid police powers,22 Annex 10-C(4)(b) is necessary to define
these police powers in CAFTA-DR, as a result of the lack of any clear definition
in international law.
By incorporating the police powers provision of Annex 10-C(4)(b) into the
"character of the government action" analysis, CAFTA-DR, similar to U.S. law, grants
considerable deference to a host state in determining whether a regulation amounts to
an expropriation.2 3 Such deference to regulations exercised under valid police powers
has already been recognized by the international community, including NAFTA
tribunals.14 For example, the S.D. Myers tribunal noted in its first partial award that:
Expropriations tend to involve the deprivation of ownership rights, regulations
a lesser interference. The distinction between expropriation and regulation
screens out most potential cases of complaints concerning economic
intervention by a state and reduces the risk that governments will be subject to
claims as they go about their business of managing public affairs.
211
However, the importance of CAFTA-DR in relation to earlier international
decisions is that CAFFA-DR codifies and adds clarity to the scope of the deferential
treatment granted to the states. Whereas a tribunal decision like the one in S.D. Myers
would only have persuasive value on a future NAFFA tribunal's determination, a
CAFTA-DR tribunal is now required to defer to police powers, based on the textual
language of CAFTA-DR, in determining whether a regulation amounts to an indirect
expropriation.2 6 Furthermore, as the CAFTA-DR's language suggests, the type of
deferential treatment granted to the states will be similar to, if not the same as, the
treatment granted by a U.S. court.
Annex 10-C(4)(b)'s inclusion in the "character of the government action" analysis
also requires a CAFTA-DR tribunal to disregard the police powers deference in
situations where a government regulation is found to be discriminatory.27 The same
212. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 104. Throughout the majority opinion, the Court
consistently makes note of the valid police power under which the "New York Landmark Preservation Law"
was exercised. Id. Had the Court found the regulation not a valid exercise of the state's police power, it is safe
to say that the regulation and its effect on the claimant's property would have amounted to a taking. Id.
213. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at Annex 10-C(4)(b). The "[e]xcept in rare circumstances" language
underscores the deference that will be given to states when creating regulations under valid police powers. Id.
214. Sampliner, supra note 62, at 10-11,17-18.
215. See, e.g., S.D. Myers Partial, supra note 17, at 1440 282.
216. See CAFTA-DR, supra note I, at Annex 10-C(4)(b). NAFTA was not bound by earlier
international decisions which recognized the police powers deference as these decisions only possessed
persuasive value on a NAFTA tribunal's ultimate decision. NAFTA, supra note 15, at 1136(1). CAFTA-DR
tribunals, on the other hand, are bound by CAFTA-DR's text that expressly mentions this deference. CAFTA-
DR, supra note 1, at Annex 10-C(4)(b).
217. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at Annex 10-C(4)(b). The "rare circumstances" exception only applies
2007 / CAFTA-DR and the Iterative Process of Bilateral Investment
type of treatment for discriminatory regulations was mentioned in the Supreme Court's
Penn Central majority opinion.218 The importance of non-discriminatory regulations is
firmly rooted in modem BITs, including NAFTA.2 19 The importance of its inclusion in
CAFTA-DR, therefore, is simply that even though a regulation may be found
discriminatory, no indirect expropriation will be recognized if the other two factors of
the three-part test are lacking. However, a claimant may still be awarded compensation
under Articles 10.3 (National Treatment) and/or 10.4 (Most-Favored-Nation
Treatment) for discriminatory treatment.
220
Mimicking U.S. takings jurisprudence, the "character of the government action"
factor in CAFTA-DR captures both the deferential treatment granted to a valid exercise
of the police powers and also the requirement that the regulation be non-
discriminatory. Yet, despite the vague reference of the "[e]xcept in rare circumstances"
language in Annex 10-C(4)(b), CAFTA-DR does not directly mention the
"extraordinary circumstances" recognized by U.S. courts for regulations that infringe
on "the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property."22' However, drawing analogies from early international expropriation
decisions may help direct a CAFTA-DR tribunal towards the same "extraordinary
circumstances" exceptions found in U.S. case law via the "[e]xcept in rare
circumstances" language of Annex 10-C(4)(b).
A suitable analogy for the Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council's categorical
per se taking222 can be seen in the NAFTA tribunal's Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico
223decision. In Lucas, the Court first emphasized the complete economic deprivation of
petitioner's land as a result of South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act.22 4 The
Court then went on to hold that when a "regulation denies all economically beneficial
or productive use of land" a compensable taking will be found regardless of the "public
interest advanced. '225 The Metalclad Corp. decision utilized a similar line of reasoning
• 226
as Lucas to come out with the same ultimate conclusion. The Metalclad tribunal first
noted the complete bar on claimant's landfill operations as a result of the Guadalcazar
Ecological Decree.227 The Tribunal then went on to state that "the motivation or intent
of the adoption of the Ecological Decree" need not be considered, as it was "in and of
to "nondiscriminatory regulatory actions." Id.
218. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978).
219. NAFTA, supra note 15. Expropriations are prohibited under NAFTA if they are not found to be
conducted in a "non-discriminatory manner." Id. at art. 1110.
220. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at arts. 10.3 & 10.4.
221. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
222. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that regulations that result
in a total deprivation of value to a claimant's property amount to a categorical per se taking).
223. Metalclad Corp., 40 I.L.M. at 50-52.
224. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009.
225. Id. at 1015.
226. Metalclad Corp., 40 I.L.M. at 50-52.
227. Id. at 51.
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itself ... an act tantamount to expropriation." 228 When considering that both U.S.
takings law229 and international expropriation law230 consistently require compensation
for regulations that deprive property of all value, it is almost certain that the same
conclusion will be reached under CAFFA-DR. By utilizing the "rare circumstances"
exception in Annex 10-C(4)(b) within the "character of the government action"
analysis, a future CAFTA-DR tribunal faced with a Lucas scenario will likely find a
compensable indirect expropriation.23 ' Furthermore, following U.S. takings law, such a
decision may be reached without weighing the public interest advanced by the
regulation.232
No NAFFA decisions directly deal with regulations amounting to a physical
invasion under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.233 or with regulations
that infringe on an owner's right to transfer under Hodel v. Irving.23 However, there is
ample international case law on which a future CAFTA-DR tribunal may rely to reach
• • • 235
the same or similar conclusions.
Certain decisions handed down by the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal236 share
considerable attributes with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Loretto.237 For
example, in Starrett Housing, Corp. v. Iran, a decree adopted by the Revolutionary
Council of Iran required "[t]he selection of [m]anager or [b]oard of [d]irectors or
supervisors [to] be done with an official letter of appointment by the ministry
concerned[,] ... [where] the previous [m]anagers and others having responsibilities for
running that company shall cease to have any authority in the company. ' 238 The
Starrett tribunal concluded that:
the appointment of ... a temporary manager in accordance with [the decree]
deprived the shareholders of their right to manage Shah Goli. As a result of
these measures the Claimants could no longer exercise their rights to manage
Shah Goli and were deprived of their possibilities of effective use and control
of it.
239
228. id.
229. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003; See also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Assn., Inc. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
230. See e.g. Biloune v. Ghana Investment Centre, 95 I.L.R. 183 (1993). This case is the international
decision on which Metalclad based its finding of an indirect expropriation. Metalclad Corp., 40 I.L.M. at 50.
231. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at Annex 10-C.
232. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
233. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
234. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715-16 (1987).
235. Sampliner, supra note 62, at 8-9.
236. See e.g. Starrett Housing, Corp. v. Iran, 23 I.L.M. 1090, 1110 (1984); see also Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. Iran, 25 I.L.M. 619 (1986).
237. 458 U.S. at419.
238. Starrett Housing, Corp., 23 I.L.M. at 1110.
239. Id. at 1116 (1984) (emphasis added).
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In Loretto, the majority opinion recognized that "government occupation of
private property deprives the private owner of his use of the property, and it is
this deprivation for which the Constitution requires compensation. 240 Whether
the Starrett decision can be considered a physical occupation is of secondary
importance (though the author believes that such an analogy can be drawn).24'
What is important is the recognition by both the U.S. Supreme Court and the
Starrett tribunal that any action that deprives a claimant of the use and control of
all or a portion of his property to a third party requires compensation.
Rather than continue to make a one-to-one correlation between U.S. and
international decisions of similar stock, it is important to simply recognize that
the "[e]xcept in rare circumstances" language of Annex 10-C(4)(b) should
adequately cover the "extraordinary circumstances" found in cases like Loretto
and Hodel. Though there is considerable international case law covering
circumstances where the CAFTA-DR "rare circumstances" might be met,2 2 the
competing interest of the state to adequately regulate under valid police powers
should always be addressed by a CAFTA-DR tribunal.243
Under the "character of the government action" factor of CAFTA-DR, the
general deference to the state as well as the "extraordinary circumstances"
identified by U.S. takings jurisprudence will likely find their way into future
CAFTA-DR tribunal decisions. Furthermore, it is more than likely that both the
scope and means of analyzing indirect expropriation claims under the "character
of the government action" factor by a CAFTA-DR tribunal will be virtually the
same as applied by U.S. courts. This is evident from both a plain language textual
comparison between CAFTA-DR's Annex 10-C 2" and U.S. taking juris-
245 4prudence, as well as the abundance of similar international case law246
incorporating the same type of analysis.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even before CAFTA-DR's inception, the similarities between international
indirect expropriation law and U.S. regulatory takings jurisprudence had already
been recognized by many legal scholars.2 47 With the creation of CAFTA-DR and
240. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432 (quoting YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 92 (1969)).
241. Starrett Housing, Corp., 23 I.L.M. at 1116 (requiring a property owner to allow a third party
access, use, and control of the property, and analogizing that this requirement is no different than forcing a
property owner to put a physical object on his property). Both require an unwanted invasion and relinquish the
use and control of some or all of the property. Id.
242. See Sampliner, supra note 62, at 8-9 (containing a detailed and thorough list of international
decisions which could fall within the "rare circumstances" envisioned by CAFTA-DR's Annex 10-C(4)(b)).
243. Id. at 9.
244. CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at Annex 10-C.
245. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
246. Sampliner, supra note 62, at 15.
247. Id. at 11 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
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similar U.S. BITs that have incorporated Penn Central's three-part test, the
similarities become even more evident. Furthermore, substantial international
case law has developed from which investor-state tribunals under CAFTA-DR
can draw direct analogies to U.S. takings jurisprudence. When considering the
inclusion of Penn Central's three-part test and the abundance of international
case law on point, it is highly likely that future CAFTA-DR tribunal decisions
will closely mirror U.S. takings law.
Even more significant is the extreme likelihood that U.S. case law will play a
part in a future CAFTA-DR tribunal's determination of whether a regulation
amounts to an indirect expropriation. After Congress approved the TPA of
2002,248 foreign countries involved in negotiations with the United States were
put on constructive notice that U.S. negotiators would not budge in their efforts
to ensure "standards for expropriation and compensation ... consistent with
United States legal principles and practice.,2 49 When the other CAFTA-DR
countries, apart from the United States, were confronted with the three-part test
in Annex 10-C during the negotiation process, it is almost certain that U.S.
negotiators would have explained the provisions using the genesis of the test:
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,2 ° as well as Penn
Central's progeny. If memoranda or minutes from these types of discussions are
memorialized, it would then seem that U.S. case law could be used to aid
interpretation of the three-part test as travaux preparatoires.2 ' A tribunal will
have to find the meaning of the three-part test ambiguous in order to turn to the
travaux preparatoireS.2 2 However, considering the amount of case law that has
been passed down by U.S. courts in an effort to determine the scope and meaning
of Penn Central's three-part test, it is unlikely that a single CAFTA-DR tribunal
will be able to do so on its own.
The most extreme application of U.S. case law by a CAFTA-DR tribunal
would be a direct cite to a U.S. Supreme Court case in the tribunal's decision.
Though the domestic law of one country is rarely used in international decisions,
it may be employed.253 A perfect example of U.S. case law being applied by an
§ 712, Reporters' Note 6 (1987), that "[i]n general, the line [drawn between compensable and non-compensable
regulatory actions] in international law is similar to that drawn in United States jurisprudence for purposes of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution").
248. 19 U.S.C. § 3802 (2004).
249. 19 U.S.C. § 3802 (b)(3)(D) (2004).
250. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 104.
251. MCNAIR, supra note 10, at 410.
252. See VCLT, supra note 7, at art. 32 (stating that "[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty ... when the in [sic] the interpretation according to
article 31 ... leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure").
253. See Statute of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") Art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
U.N.T.S. No. 993. The Statute of the ICJ identifies the generally-accepted sources of international law. Id.
These include: "(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59,
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international tribunal can be seen in the Trail Smelter Arbitration Tribunal
decision of 1939 between the governments of the United States and Canada.254 In
its holding, the tribunal stated that "[we have] been mindful at all times of the
principle of law which is set forth by the United States courts ... particularly by
the United States Supreme Court in Parchment Company v. Paterson Parchment
Paper Company (1931) 282 U.S. 555 .,255 It may be that a CAFTA-DR tribunal,
when faced with an indirect expropriation claim factually similar to an earlier
U.S. Supreme Court regulatory takings decision, will find the Court's analysis
highly persuasive and will reference it in its decision. The abundance of
regulatory takings case law in the United States makes this a definite
possibility. 56 However, whether a CAFTA-DR tribunal will resort to U.S.
Supreme Court case law in an indirect expropriation determination will depend
on the tribunal deciding the claim.
Finally, it is important to note that any U.S. case law used by a CAFTA-DR
tribunal must have been in existence prior to the conclusion of CAFTA-DR's
negotiations. As the term travaux preparatoires connotes, only those materials
used in the preparation of the treaty may be used.2 57 Therefore, anything that
subsequently came into existence after the treaty's conclusion, by definition, may
not be used.258 As a result, if in the future the Court decides to abandon Penn
Central and the three-part test, CAFTA-DR would still be bound by the test's
current application. Unless, of course, all the CAFTA-DR parties subsequently
agree to the new formulation.
As Justice O'Connor once noted "[t]he Penn Central factors-though each
has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions-have served as the principal
guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the
physical takings or Lucas rules."2'6 Though CAFTA-DR tribunals may find the
application of the three-part test equally vexing, the abundance of international
judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law." Id. (emphasis added); see also Analytical Index, supra note 12,
24.
254. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada), 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939).
255. Id. at 193.
256. See, e.g., Sampliner, supra note 62, at II (noting that "because of the comparative abundance of
precedent under domestic legal systems, such precedent should play a significant role in determining applicable
principles of international law" (citing R. Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property, I ICSID REV.- FIU
41, 59 (1986))).
257. See VCLT, supra note 7, at art. 32 (stating that "[riecourse may be had to supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty ... when the in [sic] the interpretation according to
article 31 ... leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure").
258. Id.
259. See id. at art. 31 (stating that "[tihe context, for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall
compromise, in addition to the text ... any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions"). See also CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, at art. 10.22
("A decision of the Commission declaring its interpretation of this Agreement under Article 19.1.3(c) shall be
binding on a tribunal established under this Section").
260. See e.g. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-618 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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and domestic case law on point should significantly aid their analysis.
Furthermore, even though the three-part test may be confusing at times, its
inclusion in CAFTA-DR not only narrows the scope of what may be considered
an indirect expropriation under NAFTA, but also it creates a framework "for
expropriation and compensation... consistent with United States legal principles
and practice.
'211
261. 19 U.S.C. § 3802 (b)(3)(D) (2004).

